The case of Yugoslavia does not parallel the above examples of perpetrator-victim relations. Both the victims and perpetuators of the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia had some kind of larger state association. Even if a group was a minority in a particular region, they were still able to seek protection from political leadership based on ethnic associations. This notion further adds to the significance of multiple political actors in the Yugoslav case. I believe this unique aspect of the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia is a key reason as to why the question of "at which point did war become genocide" is very difficult to answer. Unlike the Holocaust during World War II, or the Armenian Genocide during World War I, the genocide taking place within Yugoslavia was not under the cover of war, but rather the war itself. Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia it is much more difficult, or even impossible, to separate genocide or ethnic cleansing from war.
These observations bring up important questions surrounding the concept of victimhood and the relationship between war and genocide. Is a necessary component of victimhood a complete absence of state protection? To define actions as genocide, do victims and perpetrators need to be both clearly defined and distinct from one another? Can war itself be genocide? If so, how then do you answer the complex question of reparations and justice after ethnic warfare?
Ms. Bryant's post raises multiple interesting and essential questions concerning the nature of genocide and ultimately highlights an important feature of genocide and ethnic cleansing studies; namely, that the terms "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" have to be understood contextually. We have continually returned to the Holocaust as a type of paradigmatic instance of genocide and this comparison has been helpful in understanding some key elements of genocide: systematic death, targeted populations, the blurred line between political and ideological motivation and the process of othering.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, it seems we consequently fall into the trap of using the Holocaust as a measuring stick for other instances of genocide. Ms. Bryant's questions underscore the ambiguity that inevitably arises when historians and academics attempt to apply static definitions to human phenomena. No genocide will look exactly like the next; each will feature some key elements (listed above), while including its own tragic features.
Specifically, the problematic relationship between state-population and perpetrator-victim in the case of Yugoslavia draws most directly on the key elements of political/ideological motivations and "othering" communities. Politicians-- primarily Milosevic, but Tudjman, as well-- and a few nationalist revolutionaries capitalized on the delicate state of the Yugoslav confederation in order to achieve political goals. The situation escalated to genocide with the implementation of the process of "othering" nation groups in order to pursue these ends.
These two elements ultimately brought about the others, and though the genocide in Yugoslavia looked quite different than previous cases we've studied, I believe it's safe to say that the "wars of Yugoslav succession" nevertheless constitute genocide.
From this I conclude that though Ms. Bryant's questions are important in understanding the nature of genocide and ethnic cleansing, they are not necessary to an application of these terms. Rather, actions should be defined as genocide if they incorporate basic, key elements (those listed above with revision and addition) and specific questions concerning the nature of these genocides, such as Ms. Bryant's, should be used as a means to understanding these cases which we should unhesitantly deem genocide.