The case of Yugoslavia does not parallel the above examples of perpetrator-victim relations. Both the victims and perpetuators of the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia had some kind of larger state association. Even if a group was a minority in a particular region, they were still able to seek protection from political leadership based on ethnic associations. This notion further adds to the significance of multiple political actors in the Yugoslav case. I believe this unique aspect of the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia is a key reason as to why the question of "at which point did war become genocide" is very difficult to answer. Unlike the Holocaust during World War II, or the Armenian Genocide during World War I, the genocide taking place within Yugoslavia was not under the cover of war, but rather the war itself. Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia it is much more difficult, or even impossible, to separate genocide or ethnic cleansing from war.
These observations bring up important questions surrounding the concept of victimhood and the relationship between war and genocide. Is a necessary component of victimhood a complete absence of state protection? To define actions as genocide, do victims and perpetrators need to be both clearly defined and distinct from one another? Can war itself be genocide? If so, how then do you answer the complex question of reparations and justice after ethnic warfare?
