Several times during the semester
we as a class have explored the extent to which acts can be classified as
“genocidal.” Typically, this
classification rests on an understanding of intent. A breakdown of some things related to intent that we’ve
touched upon:
1) Can
one commit genocide “by neglect”?
2) Can
one commit genocide not by explicitly ordering the death of a group but by
ordering or implying that the group should be exposed to conditions which may
be expected to result in injury or death to members of that group/the
destruction of that group?
3) Or,
perhaps most controversially, can one be said to have committed genocide
without having actively exposed a group to injurious conditions (as in point two,
which could be exemplified by death marches, egregiously overcrowded facilities,
etc.), but by complete apathy? In
other words (to paraphrase Sam Paltrow in her post of March 9th,
2012)[1], is a total lack of concern about a population equivalent to intentional extermination
of that population?
It is with profound trepidation that
I consider – even in the abstract – the extent to which “intent” can be removed
from a potentially genocidal act such that said act could still be considered
“genocide” for two reasons.
Firstly, drawing any legitimate conclusion on the matter requires a
rock-solid definition of genocide.
Sufficiently divergent discourses concerning different variations of the
definition of “genocide” persist to this day, demonstrating that a crucial,
foundational element of any judgment I could make may not, in fact, exist. Secondly, I don’t have the answer, nor,
frankly, do I know where to start.
This post, then, is intended to help bring the last question I ask above
in point 3 back into the discourse.
The ramifications are potentially
enormous. If the answer is
affirmative: though I cannot prove it, I am willing to bet a large sum of money
that the number of officially recognized genocides would be obliged to increase. Or, at least, pressured to do so.
[1] http://moderneurasiangenocides.blogspot.com/2012/03/normal.html
[1] http://moderneurasiangenocides.blogspot.com/2012/03/normal.html
I would like to respond to this question of intent within the context of colonial Latin America and Nicholas Robins' article.
ReplyDeleteRobins' piece raises interesting points concerning the question of genocide, intent and the nature of colonization. I agree entirely with Robins' fundamental argument that the indigenes experience in colonial Latin America was characterized by physical, biological and cultural destruction. The persistent question of intent as usual, however, complicates the definition of these acts as genocide. My final understanding of Robin's article was that the intent behind these events is derivative of the colonial system.
In describing Spanish Crown laws intended to protect indigenous people, Robins states, "such laws, however were of little effect, not only because of the exploitative nature of the colonial system and the flexibility given to local officials by the Crown, but also because the laws concerning the Indies were riddled with contradictions and ambiguities" (314). This notion differs rather drastically from the genocides we have so far studied in this class. The physical, cultural and biological destruction of Latin American natives was not a result of a single ideology or perpetrator. In fact, colonization in Latin America was characterized by a multiplicity of relationships between indigenous and Spanish peoples. For example, the Crown's attitude and policy towards natives and vice versa differed drastically than the relations between local Spanish settlers and natives.
In immense contrast to Hitler's Holocaust or Stalin's Gulag, the perpetrator, and subsequent intent, responsible for the cultural and physical destruction of indigenous peoples in Latin America is much more difficult to locate. This notion gains further significance when considering the question of justice that is inextricably linked to modern genocides. Who would be charged with this crime in the context of colonial Latin America? Furthermore, this notion also has resonance with the recent discussion about classifying modern-day capitalism as genocide. Both demonstrate the inadequacy of the term genocide in classifying mass murder and cultural destruction perpetuated by entire economic and political systems.
In returning to the original question of intent, I would argue for a re-evalutation of its use. So far in this class, we have asked if individuals or regimes had genocidal intent. It is in this regard that we have encountered difficulties in applying the term genocide to colonial or capitalist systems. My remaining question would be if this is simply a problem of terminology within the typical definition of genocide, or is an entirely new term that could adequately describe the genocidal nature of these past and contemporary actions necessary?
I would like to suggest a place to start answering the question of intent:
ReplyDeleteWe must think of why we seek a definition of genocide (or what we think it is.)
1. The first obvious reason is in order to categorize a historical phenomenon so we will be better able to analyze and understand it. In this case, we are looking for the lowest common denominator- identity and intent. Having a flexible definition of intent is conducive to a deeper and more critical analysis of history.
2. Another reason is to achieve justice, truth, and reconciliation (whether at a local or global level)
For the second reason (which seems to be the motivation for seeking a definition for most of our class,) we have to think of what justice means to us. Does justice mean punishment? In this regard, the question of intent and Lily’s question “who would be charged with the crime” become very significant. If we seek to prosecute the “genociders,” intention of course must be demonstrable. Since the current definition of genocide currently carries legal implications and requires a body to “blame”, it is obvious that provable intent is inseparable from the definition.
It might seem dishonest and immoral to design a definition according to the purpose you wish it to fulfill. However, if we ignore the functionality of categorization of mass murder, we take the risk of arguing to semantics and historiography instead of historical fact.
I think that the discussion of intent in terms of genocidal actions is one of the most important things that we have discussed in this class because it seems to be largest deciding factor in whether or not to consider something genocide, aside from the identity of the persons targeted. I see the importance in trying to figure out the intent of someone's actions against a group of people, but I also see somewhat of a lack of importance. The discussion of intent makes me think of the Watergate Scandal and how President Nixon became completely implicit in the crimes because it could be proved that he simply had knowledge of the crimes, even without completely proving that he had ordered them or been instrumental in how they were carried out. Using this sort of reasoning, I feel that if a leader has knowledge that a group of persons is being targeted 'as such', and fails to do anything about it, it is genocide. This can become nit-picky, with the ability to put forth arguments about what constitutes intent, but I think that a broad conception of intent would be most valuable. In a broad definition of intent, I think that one can think of genocide as being able to be carried out by neglect of conditions happening, or by omission, in addition to actively trying to change conditions for the worse in order to target a group. In this way, one could look at, say, Stalin's actions with regards to the Ukrainian Famine or the conditions of the gulag, find that Stalin had knowledge of what was happening, find the evidence that Stalin did nothing to stop the mass death, and therefore define his actions as genocide.
ReplyDeleteAs Hadas mentioned above, there are obstacles and steps to trying to figure out what intent is in a past situation. However, I overall feel that intent is in place anywhere on the spectrum from actively ordering and carrying out the steps to target a group 'as such', to knowing of a situation in which a group is being targeted 'as such' and not doing anything to stop it. In thinking this, I wonder whether I am influenced by some American values that hold people accountable for not doing anything to stop a crime from happening, such as 'Good Samaritan' Laws, which compel passers by to help a person in need if it is safe to do so, whether or not you were in any way involved in the crime. Either way, I think that Genocide needs a broader conception in general (that is for another post at another time), and following this, a broader conception of intent. Because I see it as pretty clear that a group is targeted and people are guilty of doing so if the target group is in need and no one stops to help them. This in turn probably does mean what William mentions in the original post, that more events would be classified as genocide, and more cases would be forced or pressured to come out in the open.