Norman Naimark defines the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, or Holodomor, as undoubtedly constituting genocide. However, only 14 nations, most of them former Soviet Union satellites, have recognized it as such (the United States does not). Naimark's analysis of the Holodomor claims that high-level Soviet authorities, including Stalin himself, implemented and encouraged the policy of massive grain requisitioning and must have been aware that doing so would result in mass starvation and the deaths of millions. His claim is supported by Stalin's mistrust of all peasants as a class, but his suspicion of Ukrainian nationalism, which was (and still is!) very strong, is what makes the Holodomor easy to define as genocide. It may not be fair, but a racial component seems to be necessary to define an act of mass murder as genocidal.
If this is the case, though, why is the Holodomor not widely known, let alone accepted as genocide? (I am a Russian studies major, and I didn't even know about it until last year!) Naimark attributes it to the fact that Stalin killed millions of "his own people", meaning ethnic Russians, through the purges, de-kulakization, and war. His lack of discrimination in the killing process can be seen as a negation of the racial component, making it more difficult to define the Holodomor as genocide, at least in the popular interpretation.
However, the two main problems with defining the Holodomor as genocide are strikingly similar to those of the Armenian situation. First, there is the question of intent. Due to the lack of evidence, it is difficult to prove that either the Young Turks or the Stalinist regime meant to eliminate their "enemy populations" and is thus a point of contention among scholars. This leads to another issue, which is the assessment of whether premeditation is a necessary condition to define an act of mass murder as genocide. If the end result is genocide, does it matter how it started?
The second problem is that of national self- interest. In both cases, the perpetrator- nations are (or were) very powerful, and alliances with them were held in the highest priority. Thus, major Western powers, the United States in particular, have been hesitant to bring up this issue. Will the Holodomor be officially recognized as genocide by America or the international community as a whole? If the Armenian genocide provides any insight into this situation, then the answer is, sadly, no.
If this is the case, though, why is the Holodomor not widely known, let alone accepted as genocide? (I am a Russian studies major, and I didn't even know about it until last year!) Naimark attributes it to the fact that Stalin killed millions of "his own people", meaning ethnic Russians, through the purges, de-kulakization, and war. His lack of discrimination in the killing process can be seen as a negation of the racial component, making it more difficult to define the Holodomor as genocide, at least in the popular interpretation.
However, the two main problems with defining the Holodomor as genocide are strikingly similar to those of the Armenian situation. First, there is the question of intent. Due to the lack of evidence, it is difficult to prove that either the Young Turks or the Stalinist regime meant to eliminate their "enemy populations" and is thus a point of contention among scholars. This leads to another issue, which is the assessment of whether premeditation is a necessary condition to define an act of mass murder as genocide. If the end result is genocide, does it matter how it started?
The second problem is that of national self- interest. In both cases, the perpetrator- nations are (or were) very powerful, and alliances with them were held in the highest priority. Thus, major Western powers, the United States in particular, have been hesitant to bring up this issue. Will the Holodomor be officially recognized as genocide by America or the international community as a whole? If the Armenian genocide provides any insight into this situation, then the answer is, sadly, no.
The Holodomor does indeed have several similarities to the Armenian genocide, and is characteristic of several other genocides as well. Another problem with the structure of the Holodomor concerning the ability to classify it as genocide (at least for some) is the lack of outright violence. Naimark comments that Stalin made several halfhearted attempts to lend aide, but overall merely turned a blind eye to the peasants' suffering. It is unfortunately harder to make a claim for genocide when actions can be categorized as violent and murderous instead of neglectful.
ReplyDeleteThis is a reason that the Armenian genocide has not been recognized by Turkey. They fall back on the claim that deportation simply (and, they maintain, unfortunately) led to undesirable consequences and circumstances that were beyond their control. This is a claim that could be made concerning the defense of the Holodomor as well.
Generally though, the Holodomor has the characteristics of genocide, regardless of the means used. During the Holocaust, many of those interred in ghettos under Nazi control perished there from poor conditions. Does the fact that they were not shot outright negate the responsibility of the ruling powers for their deaths? Though intent is indeed often hard to prove, Stalin's actions, including requisition of grain and refusal to accept foreign aid, were directly related to the famine. That fact cannot be argued away.
When attempting to classify instances of mass-murder as genocide, historians and politicians have understood intent to be the most definitive factor. Since the Holocaust has been consistently used as a measuring-stick of sorts by which we understand and classify other instances of mass-murder (and because records cataloging perpetrator's intent in such instances have rarely been as explicitly and meticulously kept as those of Hitler and the Nazi regime) it can be difficult to unambiguously classify these instances of mass-murder as "genocide."
ReplyDeleteWhile I acknowledge the importance of preserving the meaning of the term "genocide" and treading carefully when attempting to classify instances of mass-murder as such, I find that an effort to preserve the meaning of the term we strip it of its historical and political usefulness.
If we are afraid to apply genocide to instances of mass-murder (as politicians, including those present at the UN caucus that arrived at the current definition of genocide, consistently are) out of fear that past actions taken by major European powers and the U.S. will be termed genocide, then we are not only doing a disservice to recorded history, but also to past, present and future victimized populations.
Additionally, restricting the use of the term genocide to instances of mass-murder that meet all or the majority of precepts in Nazi Germany, we, as historians and moral-persons, preclude ourselves from expanding our notion of genocide to encompass new methods of genocide. This ultimately results in an inability to identify and act against new instances of genocide when they arise.
In other words, by forcing ourselves to understand genocide through such a limited scope, we won't be able to recognize new methods employed by perpetrators in the future. Our limited conception of genocide will, as a result, obscure acts of genocide that look dissimilar to that of the Holocaust. Ultimately, I believe this tip-toeing around the term genocide will prevent us from identifying and halting acts of genocide due to our often politically-motivated blinders.