While reading Naimark's introduction, I found one of his comments particularly interesting. He states:
"Forced deportation is clearly a 'crime against humanity,' but the results can sometimes be considered 'genocidal' meaning 'like genocide,' but not necessarily with the same jurisprudential implications that come from labeling discrete episodes 'genocide,'" (13).
Naimark argues that these difficult distinctions are vital in comprehending Stalin's murderous rule and the "genocidal character of his regime," (14). Not only does the combination of these statements seem to contradict Naimark's main point in arguing that Stalin committed genocide, but it also brings up the question of distinction among crimes as being "genocidal" or "genocide". If an event, such as forced deportations, are like genocide - what does that entail? How is an event "like" genocide and not actually genocide? It seems that Naimark cites the legal implications of genocide as the determining factor of whether or not an act can be called genocide, which then brings up the question of labeling an act as genocide and considering an act to be genocide. Looking back to the events in 1920s Turkey, this distinction is especially pertinent to the argument over whether the Armenian mass murders were either just that or were genocide. And if they were simply mass murders, can we consider those murders to be "genocidal" in character without the events being labeled as genocide?
Naimark states that genocide "required a certain level of murderous premeditation... and an intention to attack the group as a whole by destroying a significant part of it," (13). Thus, not all of Stalin's acts could be deemed genocide - simply "genocidal." The difference between the two is more clearly illustrated here as being intent and premeditation - which we have discussed at length as being the most difficult aspects of genocide to prove. Because this is the case, it seems as though labeling an act as "genocidal" is a concession when intent is unprovable.
To me, this also refers back to the U.N. definition of genocide. If the definition makes it possible to distinguish acts as genocidal and others as genocide, then what does that say about how we determine what genocide is? Again, this all goes back to the idea of intent, which is such a groundless and metaphysical concept. Should the definition of genocide - that convicts some of genocide and pardons others for genocidal acts or acts of genocidal character (an even more vague label) - be based on something as difficult to prove as intent and premeditation? I would argue yes and no. Yes, because then the concept of genocide will be kept "sacred" in a sense and not used at random to describe horrific events - the idea that if everything is considered genocide, then nothing is. I would then also argue that the definition should not be based on intent and premeditation because then victims go unrecognized and perpetrators go unpunished due to a lack of evidence, such as in the Armenian case. Obviously, the legal U.N. definition is not going to change anytime soon, and until we as people are able to better define what genocide is, we will have to settle with the vague distinction between genocidal acts and acts of genocide.
I agree with you. I also feel like it could be relevant to bring up the difference between Naimark's chapter on the Holodomor in comparison with his entire book on Stalin's Genocides. In showing that even this one scholar's definition of genocide is malleable and changes over time, we understand that there are issues within the U.N. definition. If intention is hard enough to prove that Naimark will offer semi opposing viewpoints in two different books, then who’s to say what can be accused and denied?
ReplyDeleteI also feel that the quote can be interpreted in terms of scale as well as intent. While obviously there are a vast number of human lives being moved within forced deportation, the question proposed here is number of deaths. The higher the number of deaths, the higher on the scale of “genocidal” is the event. I’m thinking in particular of the “forced deportation” of the Armenians, which we consider to be genocide more than anything else, in comparison with the population transfers of Greeks and Turks around the same time, which was not considered genocide but still fell under the umbrella of “forced deportation.”
At the beginning of the semester, we talked a lot about the differences between genocide, population transfer, ethnic cleansing, and forced deportation. For me, because they all carry elements of each other within, they’re kind of hard to separate. We’re aware that the U.N. has created a (shaky) definition of genocide, but there is no legal definition of the other three (as far as I know. Maybe I’m wrong!). When we apply these labels, therefore, it seems almost arbitrary to pick one and deny the others. Granted, there are differences between them all, as we did establish, but I still feel as though it’s not quite fair to the victims to decide what is was that they experienced. On the other hand, as you argued, we don’t want to throw these terms around loosely so that they lose all sense of severity. It’s a difficult distinction to make.
The distinction between genocide and genocidal acts is indeed a curious one. How can an act be genocidal but not genocide? The implication of the term genocidal is that the act or event has characteristics similar or equal to those apparent in genocide. As a result, it seems logical that the act must be genocide if it has the genocidal characteristics. Yet, obviously scholars use the terms in distinction rather than in conjunction. Genocidal acts tend to be a tier lower than genocide itself.
ReplyDeleteTo me, the use of the term genocidal acts reveals the hesitancy of scholars to deem an event genocide. The term genocide has such powerful meaning and significance that scholars tend to shy away from calling any event genocide for fear of overusing or misusing the term. It is fair to call an event genocidal but not genocide itself. If one calls the event genocide, then one must present strong evidence that matches with the accepted definition of genocide.
As mentioned, one big issue is intent. One cannot virtually prove intent, yet such proof is necessary for deeming an act as genocide. The term genocidal act comes into play when one cannot prove that intent. The act could have been genocide, but there is no certainty of the intent of the perpetrators. Naimark uses the term genocidal act for Stalin's atrocities. Scholars still debate the intent of those atrocities; as a result, Naimark is wary of using the term genocide when he cannot properly substantiate the claim for that word.
This proves the true weakness of the current definition of genocide. Even if we include cultural genocide, we still have to prove intent, and that is always difficult. Is proof of intent truly necessary? Can genocide be unintended? Possibly so, but that would culminate in another lengthy debate. It's certainly a point worth considering though. The current definition of genocide could indeed use revision such that the Holocaust isn't the only event surely considered genocide.