David Scheffer, a law professor at Northwestern and the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues between 1997 and 2001, recently wrote an op-ed in the New York Times about the use of the term "genocide." He argued that it should be left to historians and jurists to declare what was and wasn't genocide, as politics make things too messy. What he wants, instead, is for governments to use the terms "atrocity crimes" until the label has been decided one way or the other.
Scheffer brings up the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, Darfur, Rwanda, the Balkans and Syria to emphasize his point, referring to 'genocide' as defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention. He points out the fact that in some cases, so much time was spent deliberating about whether the events constituted a genocide or not, that foreign aid didn't come quickly enough. If these governments labeled them as 'atrocity crimes,' went and helped, and then decided what it was in the aftermath, we wouldn't be running into these problems.
However, I disagreed with his argument about using the term loosely. He implied that calling the Armenian atrocity crimes a genocide was slapping the label around, and that to do such a thing would be "tragically ineffective or self-defeating." His argument that it would intimidate powerful nations from helping quickly to stop atrocities I found to be ineffective. I believe that the nature of calling something a genocide would instigate people to help, because the term connotes such horrors and monstrosities. I also believe that genocide is absolutely involved in the world of politics, as is evidenced in the fact that it was the government itself that committed these atrocious acts in several examples (the Young Turks against the Armenians, the Nazis against the Jews, Gypsies, etc). Scheffer's decision to leave it to historians and jurists strikes me as counter intuitive, considering the fact that historians might not come back to this event for a while. The deliberations of the government are relevant and important for the recognition of such crimes. It makes the events seem irrelevant if the government, seen as such a big and important factor for so many people, neglect to have anything to do with the issues at hand. As we saw in the documentaries, it's up to the governments to recognize the Armenian genocide and acknowledge that this occurred. Otherwise, these people have no sense of validation. The dehumanization process doesn't end.
I don't deny the fact that getting "unified international responses to ongoing massacres" is important. I just think that Scheffer's solution isn't necessarily the right one, and that his idea of leaving politics out of an inherently political event is a little counterintuitive.
Article: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/opinion/defuse-the-lexicon-of-slaughter.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=prejudice&st=cse
Hi Rosie,
ReplyDeleteWith this post you anticipated some of what came up in today's discussion about the purpose of and interplay between historians, politicians, and personal narratives in the context of genocide, and you probably came into the discussion better prepared for having written this. I agree with your assessment that Scheffer's argument about the label of genocide intimidating powerful nations is ineffective, as well as your statement that "The deliberations of the government are relevant and important for the recognition of such crimes." On a couple of points, however, I think you misinterpreted his argument, based on a different set of priorities.
From my reading, Scheffer's main contention is that the label of genocide, because of all the political baggage surrounding, is problematic for getting aid to victims. You and I seem to be of an accord on this. Where we diverge is in the broader implications. It seems to me that your main dispute with Scheffer is that his proposal might allow something that truly is genocide to go unlabeled as such, and your criticism of his points stems from that dispute. For example, you note that historians might not revisit a particular potential genocide for a number of years. While that is true, Scheffer would probably argue that it doesn't matter, especially if forgoing the use of the "g-word" for a few years would allow you to save the lives of thousands or tens of thousands of people.
Stemming from this, two of your arguments stuck out to me as being somewhat off target. First, you say that Scheffer implies that labeling the mass atrocities carried out against the Armenians as genocide is "tragically ineffective or self-defeating." I don't agree with this evaluation, because he is making two distinct points with these statements. Concerning the Armenians, he shows how the term genocide can set groups with divergent political interests against one another. Indeed, the refusal of the Armenians to let go of the term genocide convinced France (among other countries not named) to label it so, proving their efforts to be quite effective. When he comments on the self-defeating nature of applying the term genocide, he is referring to those cases, such as Rwanda and the Balkans, where arguments over what qualifies as genocide and if genocide requires international intervention prevented said intervention from talking place, costing lives. Second, I think he preempts your argument that "the nature of calling something a genocide would instigate people to help, because the term connotes such horrors and monstrosities" by proposing the term "atrocity crimes." It doesn't have the same ring to it now, but it very well could if it was adopted into political discourse.
I agree with you that Schaffer’s limited view of who should be able to apply the term genocide is troublesome because it doesn't allow for political discourse. However, I also agree with his main idea that allowing too many people to apply the term genocide with an un-specified definition to a broad range of events can be just as troublesome. I feel that his point has merit in that it has the potential to save lives in the long run, although it steps on many toes in the short run. I feel that your point has merit because it shows how Schaffer’s proposition is counterintuitive and probably unenforceable.